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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STAT1-OFUTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MARCUS ADAMS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050493-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
J. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence 
illegally obtained when the officer took the Defendant's identification to run a warrant 
check without an articulable, reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity? This Court 
reviews the trial court's factual findings for clear error but its application of law to fact is 
reviewed non-deferentially for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^  15, 103 P.3d 
699. 
This issue was preserved by Adams's Motion to Suppress and his conditional Sery 
plea agreement (R. 28-34, 109). 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated: and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Marcus Adams appeals from the judgment, sentence, and commitment of 
the Fourth District Judicial Court after entering a conditional plea to possession of 
marijuana in a drug free zone with a prior conviction, a third degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Marcus Adams was charged by information filed in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court on or about November 19, 2003, with possession or use of marijuana in a drug free 
zone with a prior conviction, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 
2 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i); possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5a. (R. 2). 
A preliminary hearing was held on April 22, 2004, the court found probable cause 
and bound the matter over tor trial. (R. 22). The defendant entered a not guilty plea to 
both charges. Id. 
On May 3, 2004, Adams filed a Motion and Memorandum to Suppress, claiming 
that he was illegally searched and seized, violating his rights pursuant to Article I, § 14 of 
the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (R. 
26). On October 14, 2004, the Court denied Adams motion to suppress (R. 78) and set the 
matter for further pretrial. (R. 88). 
On January 13, 2005, Adams entered into a conditional plea agreement to the 
charge of possession of marijuana in a drug free zone with prior conviction. (R. 105). The 
State dismissed count two. (R. 101). 
On May 19, 2005 Adams was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed 
five years in the Utah State Prison. (R. 119). On the same day the prison term was 
suspended. Id. Upon motion of the defendant, and after oral arguments, the trial court 
granted a Certificate of Probable Cause and stayed imposition of sentence until after 
appeal (R. 146, 148). 
On June 6, 2005, Adams filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the judgment, 
sentence and commitment in this case in the Fourth District Court (R. 133). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On May 1, 2003 around 10:00 p.m., Officer Robert Patrick of the Provo City 
Police Department spotted the defendant, Marcus Adams, standing alone in front of a 
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closed business. (R. 85). According to Patrick, he had been concerned about possible 
Ihcfts and burglaries so he approached the defendant to ascertain why he was standing in 
front of a closed business. (R. 84). 
Patrick shone a spotlight on Adams but before he approached him in uniform he 
shut the light off. (R. 151: 5) Patrick asked him what he was doing outside the closed 
business. (R. 151: 4). Adams told Patrick the he lived in a studio apartment above the 
business and that he had come outside because he was not allowed to smoke inside his 
apartment. Id. 
Patrick then noticed that Adams had a Big Gulp and a backpack with him. Patrick 
questioned him about why he had his backpack and drink with him outside. Adams said 
that he had just come from his friend's apartment and stopped for a cigarette before going 
upstairs to his own apartment. Id. 
Patrick then asked Adams for identification. Patrick took the identification and ran 
a warrants check on Adams by using the portable radio on his shoulder to check for 
warrants. According to Patrick the duration of the warrants check was approximately 30 
to 60 seconds long. Id. Patrick found no outstanding warrants on Adams but he still 
continued to question him. (R. 83). 
Patrick then asked for consent to search his backpack and Adams said he could. 
Patrick did not find any stolen goods or anything illegal, ht However, Patrick did find 
Visine. Patrick questioned Adams about the Visine and Adams told him that he used it for 
allergies. Id. Patrick then asked Adams if he had any illegal drugs on his person and 
Adams said he did not. Id. According to Patrick, he then asked Adams if he could search 
his person and Adams told him that he could. However, Adams testified at the 
suppression hearing that he never gave Patrick permission to search his person. (R. 152: 
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24). Upon searching Adams, Patrick found a pipe containing partially burnt marijuana 
and two bags of marijuana. (R. 83). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Adams asserts that from the time Officer Patrick ran a warrants check their 
encounter was a level two stop. Adams further asserts that running a warrants check on 
an individual without any specific articulable facts that an individual was engaged in or 
about to be engaged in any criminal activity resulted in an unreasonable search and 
seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Thus, the trial court's conclusion that this was a level one encounter is in error. 
In addition, the trial court erred in concluding that Adams' consent to the search of 
his backpack and person was not obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. 
Accordingly, the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress was in error and 
Adams asks this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his suppression motion and to 
remand this case with instructions that the plea is to be withdrawn, the evidence 
suppressed, and the matter dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
OBTAINED IN AN UNLAWFUL SEIZURE WHEN THE CONSENT 
TO SEARCH WAS THE RESULT OF POLICE EXPLOITATION 
OF A PRIOR ILLEGALITY 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the 
Utah Constitution were created to protect "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. 
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Const. Amend. IV. Because there were no reasonable, articulable facts that Adams was 
engaged in any criminal activity, the officer's warrants check unreasonably prolonged the 
detention and violated Adams's rights under the State and Federal Constitutions. Finally, 
the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence because any evidence was obtained 
by police exploitation of a prior illegality. 
A. The encounter between Adams and Patrick was a level two encounter from 
the time the officer ran a warrants check without reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity. 
It is well established that there are three levels of police-citizen encounters, each 
requiring a different degree of justification under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Ray, 
2000 UT App. 55,^10, 99S?2d 274, see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The first level occurs when an officer approaches and questions a 
suspect. Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at [^10. An officer may approach and question a suspect at 
any time so long as the person in not detained against his will. Id. The second level is 
reached when an officer detains an individual. Id. The United States Supreme Court has 
declared that "a police officer may detain and question an individual 'when the officer has 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is or is about to be engaged in 
criminal activity.'" State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996) (quoting United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702-03, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2641-42, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983)). 
The third level is arrest, which requires that the officer have probable cause to believe 
that a crime has been or is about to be committed. Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at 1|10. 
In State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1994), this court explained that a 
level one stop "is a voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond to an officer's 
inquiries but is free to leave at any time" (citations omitted). "Such consensual voluntary 
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discussions between citizens and police officers are not seizures subject to Fourth 
Amendment protection." State v. Bean, 869 P.2d at 986 (quoting State v. Jackson, 805 
P.2dat768. 
A level two stop occurs when a reasonable person in view of all the circumstances 
would believe that he or she is not free to leave. State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 
(Utah App. 1990). Some circumstances that might lead a reasonable person to believe 
that they are not free to leave include (1) the presence of more than one officer, (2) 
physical touching of the person, (3) or the use of language or tone of voice indicating 
compliance. Id. 
Running a warrants check on an individual without a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion is a violation of both the Fourth Amendment and Article L §14 of the Utah 
Constitution. See State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991); and Chapman, 921 P.2d at 
453. Furthermore, Utah Code Annotated § 77-7-15 states that the "officers, in • 
conducting a Terry stop, may not pursue a line of investigation not reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place/' 
In State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991), a police officer stopped a vehicle 
with faulty brake lights. Id. at 762. The driver produced a driver's license with a name 
different than that of the registered owner and she was unable to produce a valid 
registration certificate. Id. The officer then asked the defendant, a passenger in the 
vehicle, for identification, "reasoning that with no registration and no owner present, 
there was a possibility that the car had been stolen." Id. However, the officer did not ask 
either the driver or defendant who owned the vehicle. Id. The defendant denied having a 
driver's license or any identification but she gave the officer her name and birth date. Id. 
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The officer returned to his car and ran a warrants check on both occupants. 
.Johnson, 805 P.2d at 762. The check revealed that the defendant had outstanding 
warrants. Id. The defendant was arrested and a search of her backpack incident to arrest 
uncovered drug paraphernalia and amphetamines. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that her 
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated and the evidence obtained pursuant to the 
arrest should have been suppressed. 805 P.2d at 764. Although the Court found that "the 
lack of a registration certificate and the fact that the occupants did not own the car raised 
the possibility that the car might be stolen," the Court held, "this information, without 
more, does not rise to the level of an articulable suspicion that the car was stolen." Id. The 
Court stated that the officer could have questioned the occupants about how they "came 
into possession of the car," and an "unsatisfactory answer could have heightened his 
suspicion and justified further inquiry." Id. However, "the leap from asking for the 
passenger's name and date of birth to running a warrants check on her severed the chain 
of rational inference from specific articulable facts and degenerated into an attempt to 
support an as yet 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch.""' Id. (quoting 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883). 
In State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), a police officer pulled the defendant 
over for failing to signal before turning and because the officer knew that the defendant 
was driving without a license. Id. at 1129-30. The defendant could not produce a driver's 
license, but he did give the officer an identification card. Id. at 1130. A warrants check 
revealed that the defendant had three outstanding warrants. Id. A subsequent inventory 
search uncovered "several bags of cocaine." Id. 
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The Utah Supreme Court distinguished these facts from Johnson, emphasizing that 
in Johnson, "asking for the passenger's name and date of birth to running a warrants 
check on her severed the chain of rational inference from specific articulable facts and 
degenerated into an attempt to support an as yet 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion 
or "hunch."'" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
However, the Court specifically stated: 
We do not hold, however, that running the warrants check on the driver exceeded 
the lawful scope of the routine traffic stop, nor did we hold that a warrants check 
on a passenger could never be justified by specific articulable facts. Id. The Court 
remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the defendant made an 
illegal turn. 
Id. 
In State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996), a police officer employed by a 
school district observed a Jeep with two individuals in the back seat parked in a high 
school parking lot around 10 p.m. Id. at 448. The officer pulled behind the car and turned 
on his warning lights, effectively making a traffic "stop" for loitering on school grounds. 
Id. The woman and owner of the car produced a driver's license and vehicle registration; 
however the defendant did not have any identification but he told the officer his name. Id. 
Apparently the defendant was driving because the officer returned to his patrol car 
and ran driver's license and warrants checks only on the defendant. Chapman, 921 P.2d at 
448. Another officer heard the mention of the defendant's name over the radio and 
promptly contacted the officer at the scene to warn him to be careful because the 
defendant "was an alleged gang member and was known to carry a gun." Id. This officer 
also drove to the high school, and both officers approached the car and asked the 
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defendant to step out. Id. The order of the following events is unclear, but the defendant 
admitted to having a handgun and the officers conducted a pat-down search. Id. 1 he 
defendant was also arrested for violating a loitering ordinance. Id. Some point after 
discovering a gun in the car, the officers ran a NCIC stolen weapons check and 
discovered the gun had recently been stolen. Id. at 449. 
The Utah Supreme Court overturned the defendant's convictions based on the fact 
that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that the gun had been stolen and therefore 
there was no reason to run the background check on the gun. Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453-
54. However, the Court held that the warrant check on the defendant was appropriate. Id. 
at 453, 455. 
In determining that the warrants check was proper, the Court did not overrule 
Johnson but instead distinguished it. The Court reiterated that in Johnson, "running a 
warrants check on a passenger in an automobile that had been properly stopped exceeded 
the appropriate scope of detention." Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453 (emphasis in original). 
However, the defendant in Chapman was not an innocent passenger in a traffic stop; he 
was found loitering on school grounds, in violation of Salt Lake County Ordinance ch. 
10.32.010(C). Id. at 451. Thus, the defendant in Chapman was properly detained at that 
point pursuant to the loitering violation and it was therefore appropriate for the officer to 
run a warrant check on these grounds. 
That Johnson has not been overruled and is still good law is apparent in State v. 
Valdez, 2003 UT App 100, 68 P.3d 1052. In Valdez, police arrived at a residence to 
execute an arrest warrant. Id. at ^2. After finding their intended subject, the police 
accompanied her to a bedroom to allow her to dress more appropriately for the cold 
weather. Id. In the bedroom, the police found the defendant asleep on the bed lying face 
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down. Id. at ^3. The officers woke the defendant up and demanded to see his hands. Id. 
'The defendant got up and showed the officers his hands and the officers requested his 
identification. Id. The defendant denied having any ID, but told the officers his name was 
Sean Tracy Michaels, born December 4, 1961. Id. The officer then ran a warrants check 
and a NCI check. Id. 
However, at some point, the arrested subject told another officer that the defendant 
was lying and she gave the officer his real name. Id. at {^4. The officers then ran another 
warrant check on the defendant's real name and discovered that there was a warrant for 
his arrest. Id. The defendant was arrested and during a search incident to arrest, officers 
discovered methamphetamine on his person. Id. 
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress and the State appealed. 
Valdez, 2003 UT App 100 at [^5. The State claimed that the request for the defendant's 
name and subsequent warrant check "was a justifiably minimal intrusion." Id. at 1[9. This 
Court affirmed the trial court's decision, citing to Johnson where the Utah Supreme Court 
"held that running a warrants check on a passenger in an automobile that had been 
properly stopped exceeded the appropriate scope of detention." Id. at [^20 (citations 
omitted). This Court also reiterated that a "minimal intrusion" requires the police officer 
must have at least "specific facts to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity" 
before making "the leap from asking for the passenger's name and date of birth to 
running a warrants check." Id. at <[ffi's 20, 21 n. 12 (citation omitted). 
Moreover, there was reason to believe that the passenger in Johnson was possibly 
engaged in illegal activity. The officer discovered that neither the driver or passenger 
owned the vehicle nor could they produce proof of registration. Johnson, 805 P.2d at 762. 
The Utah Supreme Court determined that this information "raised the possibility that the 
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car had been stolen." Id. at 764. However, the Court emphatically declared that this, 
"without more, does not rise to the level of an articulable suspicion that the car was 
stolen.'* Id. The Court also observed that these facts Cvare just as consistent with the more 
likely scenario that the driver borrowed the car from its rightful owner." Id. (citation 
omitted). 
This Court has previously held that an officer's ^hunch" is insufficient to support 
reasonable suspicion of a crime: ""Although the deputy's hunch ultimately proved to be 
correct, a hunch, without more, does not raise a reasonable articulable suspicion 
regardless of the final result." State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah App. 1992) 
(officer stopped Hispanic driver and passenger for suspected drunk driving, but after 
confirming that both were sober, noticed driver was nervous and subsequently searched 
the car on that basis and found four kilograms of cocaine). 
In State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, If 2, 107 P.3d ^06, the officer stopped a 
vehicle that appeared to be following another vehicle to closely. As the Officer 
approached the vehicle he noticed the car smelt strongly of tobacco. Id. Upon 
approaching the vehicle, the Officer suspected that all of the occupants of the car were 
underage. Id. The Officer then asked the occupants to stick out their tongues which he 
found contained a brown residue. Id. The Officer then asked the occupants about their 
tobacco use and they all admitted to using it. Id. After the occupants admitted to using 
tobacco, he asked them for identification to ascertain their ages. Id. Chism gave the 
officer his driver license which showed that he was nineteen years old and therefore of 
age to use tobacco. Id. The officer than ran a warrants check on Chism in which he found 
out that there was a warrant for his arrest. The officer arrested Chism and began to search 
the area of the car where he had been seated. Id. at 708. The officer found drugs in a 
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backpack that belonged to Chism and the State charged him with possession of cocaine 
and drug paraphernalia. 
The only issue before the court was whether the officer's detention of "Chism to 
conduct a computer check on his identification violated the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution," Id at 709. This Court found that the officers only ground for 
detaining Chism "was his suspicion that Chism was not old enough to possess tobacco." 
Id. at 713. Once Chism gave the officer his ID and verifed his age, the officer no longer 
had any articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion that Chism was or was about to 
be involved in a crime. Id. The court held that without any continuing reasonable 
suspicion, the officers' detention of Chism to further investigate the validity of his 
identification was unlawful. Id. 
Adams asserts that Patrick did not have a reasonable, articulable assertion that he 
had committed or was about to commit a crime. Adams argues that the facts known to 
Patrick were more consistent "with lawful behavior as with the commission of crime." 
Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, f 19, 998 P.2d 274. The Johnson court also 
considered that the fact's of that case were as consistent with the more likely scenario that 
the driver borrowed the car as opposed to stealing it. Johnson, 805 P.2d at 762. Adams 
argues that many people are not allowed to smoke inside their apartment and many people 
also use Visine for allergies. Similarly, as Adams was not underage, there was nothing 
illegal about the fact that he was outside smoking at approximately 10 p.m. Therefore, 
Adams asserts that his actions were at a minimum "at least as consistent with lawful 
behavior as with the commission of a crime." 
Adams also asserts that Patrick was on a mere fishing expedition. Adams argues 
that Patrick admitted in court that he was concerned about possible thefts in the area. Utah 
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Code Annotated § 77-7-15 states that "officers, in conducting a Terry stop, may not 
pursue a line of investigation not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place." The Valdez Court also reiterated that a 
"minimal intrusion" requires the police officer must have at least "specific facts to 
support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity" before making 'the leap from asking 
for the passenger's name and date of birth to running a warrants check." Valdez, 2003 UT 
App. at ffi|'s 20, 21 n.12 (citation omitted). 
Adams argues that once he provided Patrick with a satisfactory answer as to why 
he was standing outside of the closed business-and once he showed a valid 
identification-he should have been left alone because Patrick at this point could point to 
no specific facts to support any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Therefore, 
Adams asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that his encounter with Patrick was 
not a level two stop-conducted without reasonable suspicion-from the time Patrick ran a 
warrants check. 
B. The trial court erred in failing to conclude that any consent to search was 
obtained as a result of police exploitation of a prior illegality. 
Regardless of when the encounter between Adams and Patrick became a level two 
stop, the trial court ultimately denied Adams' motion to suppress because she concluded 
that the search of his backpack and subsequently his person was supported by his 
Voluntary" consent (R. 78). However, the trial court erred in failing to conclude that any 
consent was obtained "by police exploitation of a prior illegality." State v. Hansen, 2002 
UT 125, T161,63P.3d650. 
In this case, the trial court found that there was "nothing in the facts which 
indicates duress or coercion. On the contrary, the defendant had previously consented to 
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the officer's request to search the defendant's backpack. Immediately after searching the 
backpack, the officer asked to search the defendant's person and the defendant 
consented" (R. 78-79). Accordingly, the trial court concluded wvb\ the totality of all the 
surrounding circumstances, that the officer made no claim of authority to search and 
exhibited no force, before, during or after the search, that the defendant cooperated with 
the officer's mere request to search, and there was no deception or trick on the officer's 
part. The defendant voluntarily consented to the search of both his backpack and his 
person" (R. 78). 
Even assuming that the trial court's analysis concerning the voluntariness of 
Adams' consent to search his backpack and person is correct, the trial court erred in 
failing to suppress the evidence because Adams' consent was '"obtained by police 
exploitation of a prior illegality." Hansen. 2002 UT 125 at f^ 61. The first prong for 
determining valid consent is whether the consent was voluntary and not the product of 
coercion or duress. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at [^j 56-60. However, a conclusion that the 
consent was voluntary does not end the inquiry. The second prong of the test for valid 
consent "involves an exploitation analysis. Whether a person's consent was obtained by 
police exploitation of a prior illegality." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at \ 61. This second 
prong presents a legal question that is reviewed for correctness. Id. 
In this case, the trial court-like the inferior courts in Hansen-fmlcd to consider this 
second prong. However, like in Hansen, "Although the district court did not make 
specific findings of fact regarding the issue of exploitation, remand is not necessary 
because the record is sufficient for [this Court] to" render its own conclusion. Hansen, 
2002 UT 125 at ^ 61. Adams asserts that this Court-like the Hansen court-should 
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conclude that "consent was obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality the 
unlawful detention." Id. 
The focus of an "exploitation analysis" is to evaluate "the relationship between 
official misconduct and subsequently discovered evidence to determine if excluding the 
evidence will deter future illegalities." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ^ 62 (quoting State v. 
Shoulder blade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995)). "An exploitation analysis requires 
looking at the facts of each case. The United States Supreme Court has noted three 
factors that have particular relevance in reviewing the facts: (1) the 'purpose and 
flagrancy' of the illegal conduct, (2) 'the presence of intervening circumstances/ and (3) 
the 'temporal proximity' between the illegal detention and consent." Hansen, 2002 UT 
125 at \ 64 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254. 45 L.Ed.2d 
416(1975)). 
The first factor-purpose and flagrancy-"directly relates to the deterrent value of 
suppression." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at \ 65 (citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1263 (Utah 1993)). "Where the purpose of the illegal conduct is to obtain consent, 
surpressing evidence derived from the illegal conduct 'clearly will have a deterrent 
effect.'" Id. (quoting Thurman, at 1264). Adams asserts that the only conclusion that can 
be drawn from the facts of this case is that-like in Hansen-''there was a direct connection 
between" Officer Patrick's misconduct in seizing him without reasonable suspicion and 
his consent. Patrick had observed no unlawful conduct by Adams. Patrick testified that 
he had no safety concerns about dealing with Adams. Patrick had no reasonable 
suspicion to run a warrants check. Furthermore, when the warrants check came back 
clear, he had no reason to seek consent to search Adams' backpack. And he certainly had 
no basis for seeking consent to search Adams' person, after finding nothing in the 
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backpack that would raise any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity-particularly 
Iheft-which was the reason for the encounter in the first place. Accordingly, v*v I he 
incentive present in this case to violate the constitutional guarantees ... is precisely the 
lype of incentive that must be removed../" Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at % 67 (quoting State v. 
Shoulderhlade, 905 P.2d 289, 294 (Utah 1995). 
The second factor is uwhether there were any intervening factors between" Officer 
Patrick's misconduct in unlawfully seizing Adams and Adams' consent." Hansen, 2002 
UT 125 at f^ 68. In this case-as in Hansen-"'the record reveals no intervening 
circumstances, no 'clean break in the chain of events between the misconduct and the ... 
consent/" Id. (quoting Tharman, 846 P.2d at 1274). Patrick stopped Adams and asked 
for identification and about his presence on the street. Patrick then, without reasonable 
suspicion of any criminal activity, ran a warrants check on Adams. Immediately 
following the warrants check-and without any new suspicion of criminal activity-Patrick 
asks for consent to search Adams' backpack, and then finding nothing in the backpack, 
immediately asks for consent to search his person. Therefore, there were no intervening 
factors which would mitigate Patrick's misconduct from the consent to search. 
The final factor concerns the "temporal proximity between the illegal detention 
and the consent." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at f^ 69. "A brief time lapse between a Fourth 
Amendment violation and consent often indicates exploitation because the effects of the 
misconduct have not had time to dissipate." Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 293 (citation 
omitted). Here there was no appreciable passage of time between when Adams was 
illegally seized by Patrick and when he-at Patrick's request-consented to the search of his 
backpack and then his person. Accordingly, this factor, too, is an indication of 
exploitation and weighs in favor of suppression. 
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Accordingly, Adams asserts that "Based upon the purpose behind Officer 
[Patrick's | misconduct, the lack of intervening circumstances, and the temporal proximity 
between the illegal conduct and [Adams'J consent, [this Court should] conclude that 
[Adams'] consent resulted from exploitation of the prior police illegality/' Hansen, 2002 
UT 125 at *[  70. Moreover, "the deterrent effect of suppressing this type of search and 
seizure justifies its cost." Id. 
C. The Exclusionary Rule Demands Suppression of All Evidence Discovered as a 
Result of the Illegal Detention. 
The United States Supreme Court has long held that illegally obtained evidence is 
inadmissible through operation of the exclusionary rule. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 
383. 398, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). Further, the Utah Supreme Court has 
upheld the application of that rule with reference to the federal and state constitution 
making all evidence obtained as a result of an illegal seizure to be inadmissible under the 
exclusionary rule. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990). 
Because the detention in this case was conducted in violation of Adams's right to 
be free from such searches and seizures, the exclusionary rule should bar the admission of 
all evidence found as a result of that search. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons set forth above, Adams asks this Court to reverse the trial court's 
denial of his suppression motion and to remand this case with instructions that the plea is 
to be withdrawn, the evidence suppressed, and the matter dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th dav of March, 2006. 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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This matter comes before the Court upon a Motion to Suppress submitted to the Court on 
September 2, 2004. Defendant is charged with two counts: (1) possession of a controlled 
substance in a drug-free zone; and (2) possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, both 
occurring on May 1, 2003. The defendant argues that the search of the defendant's person was 
non-consensual and, therefore, a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The defendant 
argues that the evidence should be suppressed. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS1 
1. On May 1, 2003, Officer Robert Patrick ("the officer") of the Provo City Police 
Department was on duty in the neighborhood of 180 West 200 South in Provo around 10:00 p.m. 
2. The officer noticed Marcus Barry Adams ("the defendant") standing alone in front of a 
business. The officer put a spotlight on the defendant and then turned it off; he did not turn on 
the flashing overhead lights of his police vehicle. 
hearing. 
These facts are taken from the transcripts of the preliminary hearing and the suppression 
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3. Because the officer was concerned about possible "burglaries and thefts through 
buildings," he approached the defendant to question him as to his purpose for "standing in front 
of the business that had been closed." 
4. The defendant first explained to the officer that he lived in a studio apartment above 
the business and that he had come outside to smoke because he was not permitted to smoke 
inside his apartment. The defendant had a backpack and a large drink with him. 
5. When the officer asked the defendant why he had his backpack and a Big Gulp with 
him, the defendant changed his story, explaining that he had come from a friend's apartment and 
was heading home, but had stopped for a cigarette before going upstairs to his own apartment. 
6. The officer asked the defendant for identification, which the officer then used to run a 
warrants check. 
7. The officer retained the defendant's identification for the duration of the warrants 
check—approximately 30-60 seconds.2 The officer used the portable radio on his shoulder to 
2In two different versions of his testimony, the defendant maintains that the officer 
retained the defendant's identification for about 10 minutes. 
Version A: In answering a question regarding how long the officer had the defendant's 
identification while the warrants check was run, the defendant claimed that the officer took the 
identification over to his police car and had the identification "just about until [the defendant] got 
arrested" which "was probably a good ten minutes after [the officer] took [the defendant's] ID 
and ran i t . . ." The officer still had the license when he searched the defendant's person. 
Version B: The Court later directed the defendant's attention to the defendant's 
testimony that the officer had taken the identification over to the police car. The Court asked the 
defendant how long the officer was at the car. The defendant stated that "it seemed like about ten 
minutes or so." 
The Court finds the officer's testimony more consistent and credible. The defendant's 
testimony was internally inconsistent and inherently unbelievable. Even had the officer taken the 
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contact dispatch. 
8. Although the results of the warrants check revealed the defendant had no outstanding 
warrants, the officer continued to question the defendant. 
9. The officer asked the defendant if his backpack contained anything illegal, to which 
the defendant responded that it did not. 
10. The officer further asked the defendant if his backpack contained any items of stolen 
property. Again, the defendant said that it did not, explaining that he was not a thief. 
11. The officer requested permission to search the defendant's backpack, which the 
defendant granted. 
12. The officer's search of the defendant's backpack revealed nothing suggesting the 
defendant was involved in illegal activities, but did result in the discovery of a bottle of Visene, 
an over-the-counter solution commonly used by individuals with contact lenses and/or 
individuals with allergies, which the defendant said he had. The officer stated that Visene is 
typically used by drug users to reduce the redness in their eyes. 
13. After retrieving the Visene from the defendant's backpack, the officer asked the 
defendant if he had any illegal drugs on his person. 
14. The defendant said he did not, and the officer requested defendant's permission to 
identification to his vehicle, that would have probably only added 2-3 minutes, at the most, to the 
time necessary to run the warrants check through the computer in the officer's police vehicle. 
Indeed, the defendant was not sure whether the officer kept the identification while he was at the 
car for 10 minutes or until the officer arrested the defendant 10 minutes after taking the 
identification. 
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search his person for drugs and/or contraband.3 
15. The defendant consented to the search of his person. 
16. Subsequently, the officer searched the defendant's person and discovered a pipe 
containing partially burnt marijuana. After initially attempting to move and hide the pipe, the 
defendant gave the pipe to the officer. 
17. The officer then asked the defendant if he had any marijuana on his person, and the 
defendant produced two bags of marijuana from his inside jacket pocket. 
DISCUSSION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has determined that an officer may approach an individual 
and pose questions to the individual, "so long as the individual is not detained against his will." 
State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). This is commonly known as a "level 
one" encounter. Id. A "level two" encounter permits an officer to "seize a person if the officer 
has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; 
however, the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop[.]" Id. A "level three" encounter allows an officer to "arrest a suspect if the 
officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed." Id. 
3
 While the defendant admits that he gave permission to search the backpack, he denies 
that (1) the officer requested to search his person and (2) that he ever gave consent to the search 
of his person. The Court resolves this factual dispute in favor of the State, finding the officer's 
testimony more credible, in that it seems only logical that, having requested and received 
permission to search the backpack, the officer would have asked once again for permission to 
search the defendant's person. 
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In the present case, the officer stated that the purpose of the stop was his suspicion that 
the defendant had committed a theft. Clearly, the officer's initial approach to the defendant is 
appropriate, as it falls within the level-one category. It is the argument of the defendant that the 
detention escalated to a level-two stop upon the officer's retention of the defendant's 
identification for a warrants check for 30-60 seconds. The Court finds that a detention of 30-60 
seconds would not raise the level-one encounter to a level-two. In fact, the Court finds that, even 
if, as the defendant contends, the officer had taken the identification to his car to run the warrants 
check, it would have only added a couple of minutes at the most to the length of time the officer 
retained the identification. The level-one encounter would have remained at level one.4 The 
Court does find that the encounter was raised to a level-two encounter when the officer asked for 
and received permission to search the defendant's backpack. The Court finds that the key issue 
revolves around the search of the backpack and, more importantly, the subsequent search of the 
defendant's person. 
It is well-settled that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and wherever 
an individual may harbor a reasonable expectation of privacy, he is entitled to be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citations and 
quotations omitted). Both parties concede that the defendant consented to the search of the 
defendant's backpack. The Court finds that, because the search of the backpack resulted in 
4
 The Court notes that an officer is "not required to inform a person he or she is free to 
leave during a level one encounter. . ." Salt Lake City v. Ray, 998 P.2d 274 f 13 n.l (Utah Ct. 
App. 2000) {citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980)). 
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nothing that would rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, the encounter should have ended 
there. The Court finds that the discovery of the Visene is of no importance, as Visene is a 
product commonly used by the general population for a wide variety of conditions, including 
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allergies and problems associated with the use of contact lenses. The issue remains whether a 
Terry frisk was justified or whether the defendant gave consent to the officer to search the 
defendant's person. 
In a discussion of the Terry frisk, the Utah Court of Appeals recently quoted Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (1999), noting that "[a] peace officer 
who has stopped a person temporarily for questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous 
weapon if he reasonably believes he or any other person is in danger." State v. Lafond, 68 P.3d 
1043, 1048 n.10 (Utah App. 2003). Further, "while it is not necessary that an officer actually 
have been in fear, the officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts" which, taken 
together with reasonable inferences from those facts, warrant an intrusion. Id. "The sole 
justification of [a Terry frisk] is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must 
therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, 
clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer." Terry at 29. Here, there 
is no suggestion on the part of the officer that he felt he was in danger. On the contrary, the 
officer stated that at no point during the duration of the stop was he afraid for his safety, which 
eliminates any justification for a Terry frisk. Therefore, the Court next looks at whether the 
defendant gave consent to a search of his person. 
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It is the State's contention that the defendant consented to the search of the defendant's 
person, while the defendant contends that he did not give consent to the search of his person. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that "[o]nce the officer has returned the driver's license 
and registration in a routine traffic stop, questioning about drugs and weapons or a request for 
voluntary consent to search may be 'an ordinary consensual encounter between a private citizen 
and a law enforcement official' so long as a reasonable person under the circumstances would 
believe he was free to leave or disregard the officer's request for information." Ray at f 15 n.4 
{citing United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[c]onsent is not voluntary if it is 
obtained as 'the product of duress or coercion, express or implied.'" State v. Bisner, 37 P.3d 
1073, f47 (Utah 2001) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)). The 
court stated that "[f|actors indicating a lack of duress or coercion, which should be assessed in 
the 'totality of all the surrounding circumstances/ include: (1) the absence of a claim of authority 
to search by the officers; (2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; (3) a mere 
request to search; (4) cooperation by the owner of the [property]; and (5) the absence of 
deception or trick on the part of the officer." Id. (citing State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 
(Utah 1980)). 
The Court finds nothing in the facts which indicates duress or coercion. On the contrary, 
the defendant had previously consented to the officer's request to search the defendant's 
backpack. Immediately after searching the backpack, the officer asked to search the defendant's 
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person, and the defendant consented. When the officer felt the marijuana pipe on the defendant's 
person, he asked the defendant to remove it, and the defendant eventually did so. Finally, after 
the discovery of the pipe, the officer asked the defendant if he had any marijuana on his person. 
The defendant then voluntarily relinquished two bags of marijuana from his inside jacket pocket. 
The Court finds that there is nothing that indicates that the officer would not have requested 
permission to search the defendant's person nor is there anything to indicate that the defendant 
did not grant it. 
In analyzing the five factors from Bisner and the facts of this case, the Court finds, by the 
totality of all the surrounding circumstances, that the officer made no claim of authority to search 
and exhibited no force before, during or after the search, that the defendant cooperated with the 
officer's mere request to search, and there was no deception or trick on the officer's part. The 
defendant voluntarily consented to the search of both his backpack and his person. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, the Court denies defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court orders the State 
to prepare and submit appropriate findings, conclusions, and order, pursuant to Rule 12 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this 12th day of October, 2004 
Case No. 031404423 
Claudia Laycock 
District Court Judge 
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